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Abstract
This paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate the e®ects of central
bank independence, of the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and of the inter-
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action between those institutional variables, on real wages, unemployment and in°a-
tion, in a framework in which unions are averse to in°ation. This aversion moderates
unions wage demands as they attempt to induce the central bank to in°ate at a lower
rate. An increase in the degree of centralization of wage bargaining (a decrease in the
number of unions) triggers two opposite e®ects on real wages, unemployment and in°a-
tion. It reduces the substitutability between the labor of di®erent unions and therefore
the degree of e®ective competition between them. This "reduced competition e®ect"
raises real wages, unemployment and in°ation. But the decrease in the number of
unions also strengthens the moderating e®ect of in°ationary fears on the real wage
demands of each union. This "strategic e®ect" lowers real wages, unemployment and
in°ation. For su±ciently in°ation averse unions the interaction between those two ef-
fects produces a Calmfors-Dri±ll type relation between real wages and centralization.
The paper analyzes the e®ects of central bank independence on the position and the
shape of this relation, as well as on in°ation and unemployment.
The paper features two mechanisms, one of which is novel, through which monetary
institutions have real e®ects. The paper's framework implies that social welfare is
maximized when the central bank is ultra liberal. This result is critically assessed.
Empirical evaluation of some of the theoretical implications, using data from nineteen
developed economies, is for the most part supportive of those implications.
1 Introduction
This paper takes a step towards the integration of the literature on strategic monetary policy
with the literature on the degree of centralization of wage bargaining in the economy. Inte-
gration of those traditionally separate strands of thought makes it possible to investigate the
e®ects of monetary policy and of labor market institutions on macroeconomic performance.
More speci¯cally, the paper develops a framework that delivers theoretical predictions regard-
ing the e®ects of central bank independence (CBI), of the centralization of wage bargaining
(CWB), and of their interaction, on in°ation, unemployment and real wages. Some of those
implications are then subjected to a preliminary empirical investigation using data on CBI,
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CWB, in°ation and unemployment.
In the presence of perfect information the strategic interaction between nominal wage
setters and a monetary authority that cares about both employment and price stability
creates excessive in°ation without having any e®ect on the level of employment. This is the
well known Kydland and Prescott (1977) - Barro and Gordon (1983) in°ationary bias result.
The bias can be reduced by delegating authority to a central banker whose relative concern
for price stability is larger than that of society (Rogo® (1985)). Delegation of authority to
such a "conservative" central bank reduces the ine±cient in°ationary bias without having
any e®ect on average employment and is therefore welfare improving.1 This point of view
is at the root of the theoretical argument in favor of delegating authority to a central bank
(CB) that, by nature or by law, possesses a stronger preference for price stability than the
general public.
Those results abstract from the institutional structure of labor markets and from the
possibility that, particularly when they are large, unions take into consideration the strategic
impact of their wage decisions on monetary policymakers and on in°ation. Building on the
work of Bruno and Sachs (1985), Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988) and others have emphasized the
e®ects of the degree of CWB on real wages and through them on economic performance.2
They argue that there is more wage restraint in economies characterized by either high
or low levels of CWB than in economies with intermediate levels of centralization of wage
bargaining. As a consequence unemployment should be lower at extreme than at intermediate
levels of CWB producing a hump shaped relation between unemployment and CWB.
Decentralized systems are expected to deliver a favorable macroeconomic performance
through the e®ects of competition among labor suppliers. At the other extreme, the more
1This statement abstracts from the welfare cost due to the fact that a more ("weight") conservative
central bank stabilizes employment shocks to a lesser extent. This abstraction is deliberate since one of the
points of the paper is that, even when there is no need to use monetary policy for stabilization purposes, the
degree of conservativeness of the central bank may also a®ect the average level of employment.
2One of the ¯rst to notice the potential link between macroeconomic performance and the industrial
organization of labor markets (or "corporatism") was Tarantelli (1982), who tragically lost his life due to his
professional position on those matters.
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centralized is wage bargaining, the more likely it is that unions internalize the e®ects of
their bargaining posture on macroeconomic performance. Hence, unions are likely to be less
militant the higher the degree of centralization of wage bargaining. In particular, it is likely
that under centralized wage setting, the (single) union will take into consideration the e®ect
of its actions not only on the real wage and the employment of its members, but also on
the general rate of in°ation. Union members dislike in°ation for the same reasons that the
public at large does. One important reason is that their pensions and other savings are not
fully indexed. As a matter of fact, in many countries they are not indexed at all.3
The nature of equilibrium in a modi¯ed Barro-Gordon framework where unions dislike in-
°ation is investigated by Cubitt (1992, 1995) and Agell and Isander (1993), who consider the
strategic interaction between a single union and a policymaker concerned with employment
and price stability. As in chapter 3 of Cukierman (1992), there is a basic con°ict between
the monetary policymaker and the union with regard to the real wage. A remarkable feature
of the resulting discretionary equilibrium is that, unlike in conventional monetary policy
games, employment is higher than the level desired by the union when it takes price stability
as being unconditionally assured. The reason is that, since the union dislikes in°ation, it is
willing to compromise somewhat on its real wage objective in order to induce the monetary
authority to produce a lower in°ation.4 But most existing research has limited the analysis
to the case of a single all encompassing union. A notable exception is the companion paper
by Velasco and Guzzo (1999) that appears in this issue of the Review. The similarities and
di®erences between the two papers are discussed in section 6.
This paper develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of economic performance
that incorporates institutional features of both labor markets and of monetary policy insti-
tutions. This is done by introducing the degree of CWB in the economy, as well as unions'
in°ation aversion, explicitly into a monetary policy framework of the Barro-Gordon type.
3Gruner and Hefeker (forthcoming) report that the representatives of German labor unions recently
demanded that in°ation continue to be low under the European Monetary Union.
4A similar insight appears in Gruner and Hefeker (forthcoming), Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), Jensen
(1997), Skott (1997), and Yashiv (1989).
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This framework makes it possible to examine how in°ation and unemployment relate to the
degree of CWB, to the degree of CBI and to their interaction. The analytical framework
nests existing models of the strategic interaction between the central bank and unions as
particular cases. Those models include Barro and Gordon (1983), Chapter 3 of Cukierman
(1992), Cubitt (1992, 1995), and Skott (1997).5 The framework also explicitly recognizes
that the labor of di®erent unions is di®erentiated and that the number of di®erent bargaining
units in the economy a®ects the elasticity of demand for the labor of each individual union
and, through it, competitiveness in the labor market.
Existing evidence on the e®ects of CWB and of CBI on macroeconomic performance is
mixed but provocative. Hall and Franzese (1996) produce evidence from 17 OECD countries
which supports the view that macroeconomic performance as measured by in°ation and
unemployment depends on both CBI and the degree of coordination of wage bargaining.6
In particular they ¯nd, contrary to conventional wisdom, that when the coordination of wage
bargaining is su±ciently low, a higher level of CBI is associated with higher unemployment.7
Bleaney (1996), on the other hand, working with a similar sample ¯nds no e®ect of CBI on
employment.
In spite of those mixed results, and perhaps because of them, it is important to identify
conditions under which we should expect to observe a link between CBI and unemployment.
Accordingly, the main purpose of this paper is to investigate conceptually the consequences,
for unemployment and in°ation, of the strategic interaction between central banks possessing
5Bleaney (1996) and Forteza (1998) also present a game between a number of unions and a CB as is
done here. However in their framework in°ation does not enter the unions' objective function and ¯rms have
su±cient market power to set prices as a markup over wages. By contrast in our framework ¯rms have no
market power.
6The coordination of wage bargaining is an indicator which accounts both for the structure of unions
and for that of ¯rms in the wage negotiating process. Although it is related to the concept of CWB, the
main di®erence is that the latter concept focuses only on the industrial organization of unions.
7They also ¯nd signi¯cant interactions in the e®ects of labor market and monetary institutions on the
economy. For instance, they ¯nd that higher CBI is more e®ective in reducing in°ation the lower the
coordination of wage bargaining and that there is no signi¯cant relation between CBI and unemployment at
high levels of coordination of wage bargaining.
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various degrees of CBI (or of "e®ective" conservativeness) and of labor markets characterized
by various degrees of CWB.8 One important implication of the analysis is that the shape and
position of a Calmfors-Dri±ll type relation between real wages and centralization depends
on CBI. A subsidiary objective of the paper is to take a preliminary broad look at the degree
of conformity between some of the implications of the theory and available evidence.
Our paper, in conjunction with a recent paper by Alesina and Perotti (1997), can be
viewed as generally investigating the interactions between the industrial organization of
labor markets and macroeconomic policies. Alesina and Perotti focus on the interactions
between the e®ects of labor taxation and the number of unions, whereas this paper focuses
on the interactions between the latter and the structure of monetary policy institutions as
characterized by CBI.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of labor markets and
of the strategic interaction between a number of unions and the CB. Section 3 characterizes
equilibrium real wages, unemployment and in°ation. Section 4 discusses the consequences
of CBI and of CWB for unemployment and in°ation. The results amplify and qualify pre-
vious literature by identifying conditions for the existence of: (1) a Calmfors-Dri±ll type
relation between real wages and the CWB; (2) interactions between monetary institutions
and unemployment; (3) a negative impact of CBI on in°ation. Implications for the optimal
degree of CB "conservativeness" are also derived. The paper's framework implies that social
welfare is maximized when the CB is "ultra-liberal" in the sense that it does not care at
all about price stability. The practical implications of this, initially surprising, result are
critically evaluated.
In section 5 we use institutional and macroeconomic data on nineteen developed economies
to conduct a preliminary empirical examination of some of the implications of our theoret-
ical framework. The institutional data includes indices of CWB based on OECD (1997)
8The e®ective degree of conservativeness already takes into consideration both the relative objectives
of the central bank as well as its ability to conduct policy so as to attain these objectives. A distinction
between conservativeness and independence was ¯rst drawn by Lohmann (1992) and elaborated further by
Cukierman (1994) and Lippi (forthcoming).
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and indices of CBI from Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). This is followed by a brief
comparison to recent literature in section 6 and by concluding remarks.
2 A Simple Game between n Independent Unions and
the Central Bank
The economy consists of n independent unions and of a CB whose degree of in°ation aversion
is characterized by a parameter I .9 The typical union likes high wages and low unemployment
for its members and also dislikes in°ation to some extent. This is captured by the loss
function:
-j ´ ¡2wrj +Au2j +B¼2 (1)
where uj is the rate of unemployment among members of union j, ¼ ´ p ¡ p¡1 is the
rate of in°ation (de¯ned by the di®erence in the log of the price level) and A and B are
positive parameters. The ¯rst two arguments re°ect the union's sectorial interest and are
conventional in the theory of trade unions' behavior.10 The third one re°ects the union's
aversion to in°ation.
The CB is concerned with aggregate unemployment (u) and price stability. More pre-
cisely, the objective of the CB is to minimize the following loss function:
¡ ´ u2 + I¼2 (2)
where I is a measure of the relative in°ation aversion of the CB. This parameter is also known
as the degree of (multiplicative) CB conservativeness.11 We consider a two-stage game and
9An independent union is a union that has the authority to decide its wage policy in an independent
manner.
10See for example Oswald (1982).
11I should be interpreted as the e®ective degree of conservativeness that takes into consideration both
the relative objectives of the CB as well as its ability to realize those objectives (see also footnote 8). Since
existing measures of CBI aim at measuring the combined e®ect of those two elements we use the terms
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solve it by backward induction. In the second stage, the CB chooses in°ation, taking the
nominal wages previously set by all the unions as given, so as to minimize its loss function.
In the ¯rst stage each union chooses its nominal wage rate so as to maximize its objectives,
taking the nominal wage rates chosen by all other unions and the subsequent central bank
reaction as given. (The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1). In this framework,
CBI is proxied by the central bank (e®ective) degree of conservativeness, I, and the CWB
by 1=n which increases when the number of unions bargaining independently decreases.
Figure 1 about here
2.1 The labor market
Total labor supply in the economy is L. All labor is (e®ectively) unionized and is evenly
distributed over the n unions. Although the labor of any given union can be usefully employed
in all industries it is not perfectly substitutable for the labor of other unions.12 Labor of a
given union is supplied completely inelastically and is mobile across industries. The demand





(d¡ wrj)¡ °(wrj ¡ wr)
¸
L (3)
where Ldj is demand for the labor of that union, wrj is the (logarithm) of the real wage





is the (arithmetic) mean of wrj over all unions in
the economy and d, ® and ° are positive parameters. This demand function states that
the share (in total labor force) of labor demand facing union j is decreasing in its own real
wage and increasing in the average real wage in the economy. This demand emanates, in
general, from all industries although the demand for the labor of a particular union may be
dominated by the demands of a smaller number of industries. The speci¯cation of demand
presumes that each worker is a±liated with only one union. Summing over unions, aggregate
demand for labor in the economy is given by:
conservativeness and CBI interchangeably in the remainder of the paper.





Ldj = ®(d¡ wr)L : (4)
Equation (4) states that aggregate demand for labor depends (negatively) only on the
average real wage wr. In particular aggregate demand for labor does not depend on the
number of unions in the economy. Equation (3) implies that any union that sets its real
wage equal to the average real wage in the economy obtains 1=n of aggregate labor demand.
When it sets the real wage above (below) the mean wage its total share of aggregate demand
is lower (higher) than 1=n. But since labor is di®erentiated deviations of the real wage of
a particular union from the economy wide average do not induce a total loss of demand or
an in¯nite demand. For a given number of unions the parameter ° measures the degree of
substitutability between the labor of di®erent unions.
Equation (3) implies that the absolute value of the elasticity of labor demand facing
union j, ´j , with respect to the (level of the) real wage set by the union is:
´j =
® + °(n¡ 1)
®(d¡ wrj)¡ n°(wrj ¡ wr)
: (5)
This elasticity is increasing with the degree of decentralization of wage bargaining as mea-
sured by n provided wrj does not deviate too much, in an upwardly direction, from the mean
real wage.13 Thus, equation (3) implies that, although total labor demand does not depend
on the degree of centralization of wage bargaining, the extent of wage competition among
unions is larger when the labor force is spread over a larger number of bargaining units. This
13The sign of the partial derivative of ´j with respect to n is determined by the sign of
®(d ¡ wr) ¡ °(wrj ¡ wr)
which is positive if and only if




Provided aggregate labor demand is positive, d ¡ wr is positive as well implying that as long as the real
wage chosen by an individual union is not "too much" above the economy wide real wage ´j is increasing in
n: As will become apparent later this condition is always satis¯ed in equilibrium.
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is the competition e®ect of more decentralization discussed by Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988)
and Calmfors (1993).
3 Characterization of Equilibrium
In the second and last stage of the game the CB takes the nominal wages set by unions as
given and chooses the rate of in°ation so as to minimize the losses in equation (2). We thus
focus on discretionary monetary policy. In the ¯rst stage each union chooses its nominal
wage taking as given the nominal wages of all other unions and the reaction function of the
CB. We assume for simplicity that all unions are identical in size, so each of them possesses
a total labor supply of Lj = L=n.
3.1 Choice of in°ation by the central bank
Reformulating the labor demand equation in terms of nominal wages and in°ation leads to
the following aggregate unemployment equation:
u ´ L¡ L
d
L
= ® (w ¡ ¼ ¡ p¡1 ¡wcr) (6)
where w ´ Pnj=1 wjn is the average nominal wage, p¡1 is the (log of the) previous period price-
level and wcr ´ d¡ 1® is the market clearing real wage, at which u = 0.14 The central bank's
problem is to choose the in°ation rate to minimize the loss function in equation (2), subject




(w ¡wcr ¡ p¡1) : (7)
Equation (7) can be rewritten, splitting the nominal wage into its real and expected
price-level components (w = wr + Ep) as:






(Á+ E¼), Á ´ wr ¡ wcr: (8)
Since it represents the excess of the average equilibrium real wage over the competitive real
wage we refer to Á as the (real) wage premium. The CB reaction function in equation (8)
implies that the CB partially accommodates the average wage premium as well as expected
in°ation. In particular, the more militant are unions on average (the higher Á), the higher
is the rate of in°ation produced by the CB. For given values of expected in°ation and
of unions' militancy the extent of accommodation is larger the higher is the response of
aggregate labor demand to the average real wage, ®, and the lower the conservativeness of
the CB, I . Since there is no uncertainty and expectations are rational the rate of in°ation
is forecasted perfectly by unions at contracting time. Imposing the rational expectations





which shows the well known Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro-Gordon (1983) result
that in°ation is positive when the "natural" unemployment rate is above the desired rate
(zero in our case).15 It also appears that, for a given wage premium, in°ation is lower the
higher is I .
3.2 Choice of wage rates by unions
In the ¯rst stage each union chooses the nominal wage wj so as to minimize the loss function
in equation (1), taking nominal wages of other unions and the reaction function of monetary
policy to nominal wages (eq. 7) as given. The unemployment rate among union's j workers
is given by:16
15Unemployment is positive when the real wage exceeds the competitive level (i.e. for all Á > 0).
16This formulation assumes that labor contracts are such that each union picks the wage rate, leaving the
expost determination of employment to management. This is sometime known as the "right to manage"





= ® (wj ¡ ¼ ¡ p¡1 ¡ wcr) + °n(wj ¡ ¹w): (10)





¡2(wj ¡ ¼ ¡ p¡1) +A [® (wj ¡ ¼ ¡ p¡1 ¡ wcr) + °n(wj ¡ ¹w)]2 +B¼2
o
(11)
where E is the expectations operator. It is shown in the appendix that the solution to this







+A [®Z + °(n¡ 1)]
o = Áj ; 8 j0s: (12)
where





; j = 1; :::; n:
This is also the wage premium of each individual union since the problem is symmetric.
Note that the wage premium is lower, and employment higher, the higher the parameters
A and B. Z is the impact of a one unit increase in the nominal wage rate on the typical
union's real wage rate taking into consideration the reaction function of the CB. Thus Z is
a measure of the e®ectiveness of changes in the nominal wage in bringing about changes in
the real wage. For ¯nite values of CB conservativeness and of the number of unions this
e®ectiveness is smaller than one. This implies that in order to raise its real wage by one
unit the union has to raise its nominal wage rate by more than one unit. The expression for
Z suggests that this e®ectiveness is lower the smaller the number of unions and the more
liberal is the CB (the lower I). It can be shown that, other things the same, the wage
premium is an increasing function of Z: Substituting the expression for Z into equation (12)
and rearranging, the wage premium can be expressed as




I [(n¡ 1)®2 + nI ]
® fB®3 +AI [®((n¡ 1)®2 + nI) + °(n¡ 1)n(®2 + I)]g = Áj ; 8 j
0s: (13)
The equilibrium rate of unemployment is, from equation (6):
u = ®Á: (14)
It appears from (13) that the equilibrium average wage premium is positive, and therefore
so are unemployment and in°ation (from equations 9 and 14). The ¯rst two results are a
consequence of the fact that each union is willing to in°ict some unemployment on its
members in order to raise the real wage of the employed members above the competitive
level. The last result is due to the policymaker's incentives under discretionary policy.
4 Features of Equilibrium Outcomes
Equation (13) shows that the equilibrium wage premium depends on a number of structural
parameters, such as the degree of CBI (I) and of CWB (1=n), unions' preferences (A;B)
and on the degree of labor substitutability across unions as characterized by °. This section
presents several comparative statics experiments that study how equilibrium outcomes vary
when some of those parameters change. Examination of equation (13) yields the following:
Proposition 1 For a ¯nite number of unions, the more unions care about price stability
(the higher is B) and/or the higher is substitutability between di®erent types of labor (the
higher is °), the lower is the equilibrium real wage premium and, correspondingly, the lower
are unemployment and in°ation. Both e®ects become negligible as n ! 1.
Unions' concern with price stability moderates their wage demands. The reason is
that each union realizes that by raising its wage it increases the CB incentive to in°ate in
order to reduce unemployment. When unions dislike in°ation, the recognition of the CB
incentives moderates wage demands. A similar result is produced by a higher degree of
labor substitutability. This increases the elasticity of the labor demand faced by unions, and
therefore induces a less aggressive wage behavior.
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The moderating e®ect of unions' in°ation aversion is strongest when there is only one
union since a single union fully internalizes the e®ect of its wage decisions on the subsequent
rate of in°ation. As the number of unions increases each union internalizes only a fraction of
the e®ect of its own wage decisions on subsequent in°ation. As a consequence the moderating
e®ect of unions' in°ation aversion on their wage demands is weaker and tends to vanish as
unions become atomistic (i.e. as n tends towards in¯nity). Similarly, the impact e®ect of
di®erent degrees of labor substitutability becomes negligible as n becomes large, due to the
fact that labor market competition reduces the wage premium towards zero for any (strictly
positive) degree of substitutability.17
4.1 The e®ects of CWB on in°ation and unemployment
A change in the degree of centralization (1=n) of wage bargaining triggers two opposite
e®ects on the level of real wages: A competition e®ect and a strategic e®ect. Consider, for
concreteness, a reduction in the degree of centralization of wage bargaining (an increase in
n). By increasing the elasticity of demand facing a typical union (see equation (3) and its
discussion) such a change reduces the market power of the typical union. Taken in isolation
this enhanced competition e®ect reduces real wages. But the increase in n also reduces
the extent to which each individual union internalizes the strategic e®ect of its own actions
on price stability through the reaction of the CB. This reduces the moderating e®ect of
in°ationary fears on unions' wage demands and pushes real wages up. As explained below,
the conjunction of those two opposing e®ects may produce a hump shaped relation between
the real wage and the CWB.
Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988) and Calmfors (1993) have hypothesized that the competi-
tion e®ect dominates when centralization is low and that the strategic e®ect dominates when
centralization is high making the level of real wages relatively high (low) at intermediate (ex-
treme) levels of centralization. This led them to conjecture that the relation between the
17Formally this can be seen by noting that as n becomes large the partial derivatives of the premium with
respect to both B and ° converge to zero.
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level of real wages and centralization is hump shaped.18 Equation (13) gives the total rela-
tionship between the equilibrium real wage premium and the degree of centralization of wage
bargaining taking both the competition and the strategic e®ects into account. Di®erentiating









In2 + ®2(n¡ 1)2
´i
(15)
where D is the expression in the curly bracket appearing in the denominator of (13). This
leads to:
Proposition 2 : i. If B < AI
2°
®3
´ Bc, @Á@n < 0 at all n.
ii. If B > Bc ,
@Á
@n
> 0 at low n and @Á
@n
< 0 at high n.
Proof. The sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the expression in the square
bracket, which is monotonically decreasing in n. Therefore, if the expression is negative for
n = 1 (which occurs when B < Bc) it is negative at all n: Otherwise, the expression becomes
negative for su±ciently large n.
Intuitively the proposition says that when unions have little concern for price stability (B
is small) the competitive e®ect dominates the strategic e®ect at all levels of centralization. As
a consequence real wages increase monotonically with the degree of centralization. But when
unions' aversion to in°ation is larger than some threshold the competition e®ect dominates
at low levels of centralization (high n) and the strategic e®ect dominates at high levels of
centralization (low n). Figure 2 illustrates the two possible cases.
18To be precise, the strategic e®ect in Calmfors and Dri±ll is somewhat di®erent from ours since there is
no CB and general in°ation in their framework. Their mechanism operates through the e®ect that a change
in n has on the degree of internalization by an individual union of price level e®ects of own wage increases
on real wages of other unions (reducing the real wage of others through relative price change). Although
this e®ect also appears in our model, it is not su±ciently strong to produce a hump-shaped relation by
itself (we also need to postulate trade unions' in°ation aversion to produce that result). However, since the
spirit of our hypothesis is similar to theirs, we refer to the hump shaped relation between real wages and
centralization, that we obtain, as the "Calmfors - Dri±ll" curve.
16
Equations (9) and (14) imply that in°ation and unemployment are positively related to
the equilibrium wage premium. This leads to:
Proposition 3 : The qualitative relation between in°ation and unemployment, on one hand,
and the CWB, on the other, is the same as the qualitative relation between the equilibrium
wage premium and the CWB. In particular, the conditions that govern this relation are
identical to the conditions that determine the relation between the wage premium and the
CWB in proposition 2.
Thus, in°ation and unemployment increase monotonically with centralization, or display
a hump-shaped relation with it, depending on whether unions' in°ation aversion is lower
than, or higher than, the threshold Bc.
Figure 2 about here
The threshold level Bc ´ AI
2°
®3
implies that an inverted U relation between real wages
and centralization (the reciprocal of n) is more likely to arise the lower the substitutability
between the labor of di®erent unions (lower °), the lower I and the less unions care about
unemployment among their members (the lower A).
It is possible to use equation (15) to ¯nd the peak of the Calmfors Dri±ll curve (CDC).







(®2 + I)¡ I®2
®2 + I
: (16)
Analysis of the expression in equation (16) reveals that n¤ is lower the higher is I:19 Thus,
the higher CBI the larger the range of centralization levels for which further decentraliza-
tion is bene¯cial in the sense that it is likely to reduce both in°ation and unemployment.
Conversely, the lower CBI, the larger the range of levels of centralization for which further
centralization is bene¯cial since it reduces in°ation and unemployment. An increase in CBI
19The existence conditions for an economically meaningful peak (i.e. n¤ > 1) requires that B > Bc, which
obviously indicates that the peak exists only when the relation is hump shaped.
17
also shifts the entire curve up (see the next subsection). This is illustrated in Figure 3. Note
also that the peak of the CDC occurs at a higher level of centralization, the larger is B and
the lower are ° and A.
Figure 3 about here
For the case in which the relation between in°ation and unemployment, on one hand, and
centralization on the other is humped shaped, it is of interest to compare the performance
of a totally centralized system of wage bargaining (where n = 1) with that of a fully decen-
tralized one (where n ! 1). Equation (13) implies that in a fully decentralized system the
wage premium is zero. It follows, that in°ation and unemployment are also zero in a fully
decentralized system. At the other extreme, when n = 1, the wage premium is positive and
so are unemployment and in°ation. The intuition underlying this result is simple. Full de-
centralization of bargaining in the labor market completely eliminates the monopoly power
of unions by increasing the elasticity of labor demand facing each individual bargaining unit.
Since the existence of union's monopoly power is the original (and sole) source of unemploy-
ment and (consequently) of in°ation in the model, a competitive labor market eliminates
both problems, irrespectively of the degree of CBI. Under full centralization, on the other
hand, the single union retains some degree of monopoly power. This produces a positive
wage premium which leads to positive in°ation and unemployment. These observations are
summarized by:
Proposition 4 : Both unemployment and in°ation are lower in a fully decentralized labor
market than in a fully centralized one, as long as the weight attached to in°ation by the CB
is non-zero.
Proof. Note from equation (13) that lim
n!1
¹Á = 0 and that ¹Á = I
2
®2[B®2+AI2]
at n = 1. Since
both in°ation and unemployment are increasing in ¹Á, it follows from equations (9) and (14)
that in°ation and unemployment are smaller for n ! 1 than for n = 1, 8 I > 0.
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4.2 The e®ect of CBI on unemployment
An important feature of the equilibrium is that the structure of monetary policy institutions
a®ects real macroeconomic variables like unemployment in spite of the fact that, from a
purely economic point of view, money is neutral. Since this is due to the strategic interaction
between unions and the monetary authority we refer to those non-neutralities as "strategic".
These strategic non-neutralities operates through two distinct channels. The ¯rst is due to
the fact that, since unions are averse to in°ation, they moderate their real wage demands
in order to moderate the in°ationary temptations of the monetary authority. The second is
due to the fact that a one unit change in a union's nominal wage, taking the CB reaction
into consideration, has marginal impacts on its real wage and on its relative wage which
depend on the level of CBI. The second non neutrality is operative only in the presence
of more than one union. Whereas the ¯rst channel has appeared in some of the recent
literature (footnote 3) the second channel is novel. A fuller intuitive discussion appears after
the following proposition.













Proposition 5 : An increase in the degree of central bank conservativeness raises the rate
of unemployment if at least one of the following conditions holds:
i. B > 0 (unions are averse to in°ation)
or
ii. ° > 0 and n > 1 (there are at least two unions and some degree of substitutability in
the demands for their labor).
As unions become very small (n ! 1) this e®ect becomes negligible.
The two conditions in the proposition correspond to the two di®erent strategic non-
neutralities mentioned above. The ¯rst one operates through trade unions' concern about
19
price stability (B > 0). In particular, the higher is the in°ation aversion of the CB the smaller
are the in°ationary consequences of a higher wage premium. Hence a more conservative
central bank induces unions to demand higher real wages (as this triggers a lower in°ationary
reaction).
Provided there is more than one union in the economy, there is a second source of "strate-
gic non-neutrality" which operates even when unions are not concerned with price stability
(B = 0). It is due to the fact that under nominal contracting, the tradeo® between the real
wage and the relative wage facing the individual union depends on the level of CBI. More
precisely, the marginal impact of a unit increase in a union's nominal wage rate on its real
wage depends (positively) on CBI whereas its impact on the relative wage does not depend
on CBI. As a consequence, to obtain a unit increase in its real wage rate, the union has to
accept an increase in its relative wage that is larger the smaller CBI. Thus, a less in°ation
averse central bank leads unions to perceive a given increase in their own real wage as more
costly in terms of competitiveness (relative wage). We therefore refer to this second strategic
non neutrality as a "competition induced strategic non neutrality" (CISNN). The CISNN
moderates unions' real wage demands in comparison to a situation in which wages are fully
indexed. Since the CISNN vanishes in the presence of full indexation it makes a di®erence
whether wage contracting is in nominal or in real terms.20
The impact of CBI on the magnitude of the CISNN can be seen more sharply by noting
the following. The marginal impact of an increase in the union nominal wage on the real
wage rate is given by Z in the expression immediately following equation (12) and is an
increasing function of CBI. Hence the higher CBI, the narrower the divergence between the
marginal impact of an increase in the nominal wage rate on the relative wage and on the
absolute real wage, and the weaker therefore the moderating impact of the CISNN. At the
other extreme, when I is low, the moderating e®ect is strong since the individual union has
to incur a higher deterioration in competitiveness for a one unit increase in its real wage rate.
20In the presence of full wage indexation the marginal impact of a change in the nominal wage rate on
the real wage does not depend on CBI. As a consequence there is no moderating e®ect on equilibrium real
wages under full indexation.
20
Note that when the CB is concerned only about in°ation (I ¡! 1) this moderating e®ect
vanishes as well. The implications of proposition 5 for the Calmfors-Dri±ll curve, when such
a curve exists, are illustrated in Figure 3.
These results concerning non-neutralities contrast with most of the literature on monetary
policy games under perfect information in which CBI a®ects in°ation but does not a®ect
real variables. Neutrality reappears, however, even when conditions i and ii hold, when n is
large since in this case each individual union basically neglects the e®ect of its own actions
on in°ation.21 The conventional Barro and Gordon result in which unions disregard the
strategic impact of their actions on in°ation can therefore arise even when unions dislike
in°ation provided their number is large. The structure of labor markets in the US, in which
wage bargaining is highly decentralized, appears to conform with this particularization of
the model.
4.3 The e®ect of CBI on in°ation
Examination of equation (9) reveals that CBI (or e®ective conservativeness) has two opposing
e®ects on the rate of in°ation.22 Given the wage premium, Á, an increase in conservativeness
reduces equilibrium in°ation as in Rogo® (1985). But, as can be seen from equation (13),
the increase in I also raises the wage premium which tends to increase the rate of in°ation.
The mechanism underlying the second e®ect is that, since a more conservative CB in°ates
less at any level of wages, unions can raise real wages and bear smaller in°ation costs while
doing that. The total e®ect of an increase in independence on in°ation can be obtained from












21This can be seen by noting that expression (17) converges to zero as n tends to in¯nity (a higher power
of n appears in the denominator than in the numerator).
22The reader is reminded that, for reasons that are elaborated in footnotes 8 and 11, we use CBI and
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The main implication of equation (18) is summarized in the following:
Proposition 6 : The sign of the partial derivative of in°ation with respect to the in°ation
aversion of the CB is negative for a su±ciently large n, but may be positive for given values
of n if B is su±ciently large.
Proof. The sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the expression in the curly
brackets in the numerator. This expression is a sum of three terms, the ¯rst two of which
are positive and the last one negative. When n increases the negative term grows at a faster
rate than the two positive terms. Hence , for a su±ciently large n the whole expression
eventually becomes negative. For a given n; the expression is positive if B is su±ciently
large.
The proposition implies that the marginal impact of CBI on in°ation may be positive
at high levels of centralization but that it is always negative for su±ciently low levels of
centralization. The reason is that, at high levels of centralization, the in°ationary impact
of an increase in the real wage premium due to an increase in CBI may dominate the
direct negative e®ect of higher CBI on in°ation. As the number of unions becomes large,
however, the latter e®ect eventually dominates. This happens since smaller unions internalize
in°ation changes to a lesser extent into their wage decisions. Thus, a su±ciently large
number of unions delivers the "traditional" result that higher central bank conservatism (or
"independence") reduces in°ation.
4.4 The "Ultra liberal CB" - a fable for social welfare maximizers
A quick examination of equation (13) reveals that if I = 0 the real wage premium is zero,
and hence so are in°ation and unemployment. If a "social" welfare function is speci¯ed in
terms of in°ation and unemployment as: ¡soc ´ u2 + Isoc ¢ ¼2 (where Isoc > 0), it follows:23
23This is common practice in the literature on strategic monetary policy.
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Proposition 7 : The (no shocks) social welfare is maximized when the central banker is
"ultra-liberal" in the sense that she is concerned only with unemployment (I = 0).
What is the intuition underlying this (initially) surprising result? Since the "ultra-liberal"
CB cares only about unemployment it produces very high in°ation even when unemploy-
ment is mildly positive. Even if they are moderately averse to in°ation (in the sense that
B is small but strictly positive) unions still strongly dislike such very high in°ation rates.
Since they know that even the slightest level of unemployment will induce the CB to in°ate
at an extremely high rate, they all reduce their wage premiums to zero in order to avoid this
calamity. And, indeed, when Á = 0 the CB has no reason to in°ate. An ultra-liberal CB
thus delivers both zero in°ation and zero unemployment. The proposition implies that if
the main reason for unemployment is the market power of unions an ultra-liberal CB has a
comparative advantage in preventing them from using this power by e®ectively threatening
them with unbearable in°ation whenever any one of them sets the real wage above the com-
petitive level. In a wider sense this result suggests that if the CB is known to be extremely
liberal other institutions in society adjust their behavior so as to induce the CB to maintain
in°ation at a reasonable level.
4.4.1 Discussion
How realistic is the ultra-liberal central bank result as a practical guide for the choice of
central banker types? We believe that, although it is a useful benchmark to keep in mind for
economies with a substantial concentration of unions, some quali¯cations are in order before
this result can be translated into a practical policy prescription. First, unemployment is also
due to factors like generous unemployment bene¯ts, social security, minimum wage legislation
and shifts in demand across sectors. Since some but not all of those are, in general, due to the
bargaining power of unions only part of unemployment is directly traceable to their activities.
Under such circumstances the threat of very high in°ation by an ultra-liberal central banker
will not eliminate all unemployment. If the CB is unable to distinguish between that part of
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unemployment that is due to unions' activities from the part that is not, the appointment
of an ultra-liberal central banker may lead to extremely high in°ation.
Second, literally interpreted, the model predicts that the moderating e®ects of the ex-
pected reaction of the CB on the choice of real wages by unions becomes negligible only
when the number of unions goes to in¯nity. In practice, as a rule of thumb, unions are likely
to totally disregard the reaction of the CB once the e®ect of their wages on this reaction
falls below a certain threshold even when their number is ¯nite. Obviously, in such a case,
there is a risk that the deterrent e®ect of a highly in°ationary CB on unions' wage choices
will not be operative.
In summary, it appears that the ultra-liberal central bank result is more likely to provide
guidance for the choice of central bankers when the labor force is organized in a small number
of in°ation averse unions and it is relatively easy to distinguish between unemployment that
is due to the monopsony power of unions from unemployment that is due to other reasons.
5 Some Evidence
The main empirical implication of the theoretical model is that, in addition to direct e®ects,
there may be signi¯cant interactions between the e®ects of labor market and of monetary in-
stitutions on unemployment and in°ation. From this perspective, one testable implication of
the model concerns the hump-shaped relation between unemployment and the CWB hypoth-
esized by Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988). Existing evidence concerning this relation appears
to be mixed.24 Our analysis quali¯es the Calmfors and Dri±ll proposition by indicating
that whether a hump-shape relation between unemployment and CWB will be observed
depends, among other things, on the level of CBI.25 This suggests that a possible reason
24For instance, Bean (1994), Grier (1997), Soskice (1990) and OECD (1997) ¯nd no evidence in favor of
the hump-shape hypothesis. On the other hand supportive evidence appears in Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988),
Bleaney (1996) and Scarpetta (1996). For a more comprehensive survey of the empirical results of previous
studies see OECD (1997).
25This statement is true for a given range of variation of n. More generally there will always be a hump
if B > Bc (cf. proposition 2). However, for a given range of variation of n, the downward segment of the
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for the mixed empirical ¯ndings of previous studies is that they did not control for possible
interactions in the e®ects of CBI and of CWB on unemployment. Moreover, the model sug-
gests the possibility that (for ¯nite n) CBI may have a positive impact on unemployment
and (for n not too small) a negative impact on in°ation.
A preliminary investigation of the e®ects of CBI and CWB on macroeconomic perfor-
mance, which accounts for interactions between those institutional variables, is attempted
here. The empirical proxies for the degree of CWB and of CBI required for the empirical
analysis are discussed in the next subsection. There are several di±culties involved with
the precise measurement of the concepts used in the theoretical model. Before presenting
the proxies for these institutional variables, it has to be stressed that the possibility of mea-
surement errors and the limited availability of data pose some limits to the robustness of
the analysis. Additional e®orts to tackle these problems are an important task for future
empirical work.
5.1 The measurement of CWB, CBI, and of economic perfor-
mance
The empirical analysis is based on a set of indicators for the structure of collective bar-
gaining recently constructed by the OECD (1997). All variables are shown in Table 1. In
order to proxy the theoretical concept of CWB, we use the OECD index of the degree of
centralization of wage-bargaining. Centralization indicates the predominant level at which
wage-negotiations occur: economy-wide-, sectorial- or local-level. It is natural to assume, at
least as a ¯rst approximation, that as wage bargaining becomes more decentralized (e.g. as it
switches from the national- to the local-level), the number of negotiating units which bargain
in an uncoordinated manner (i.e. playing Nash) increases. This corresponds to an increase
of n in the theoretic model. Hence, centralization can be interpreted as a proxy for 1=n.
We use the OECD index of centralization to build the index CEN which groups countries
into three broad categories according to whether the wage-bargaining process is predomi-
hump may not be observable for a "su±ciently large" I.
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nantly decentralized (¯rm/plant level), intermediate (sectorial/industry level) or centralized
(national level).26 Decentralized systems, such as Canada, Japan and the US, are at the
bottom of the scale (score 1), centralized systems, such as Austria and Finland, are at the
top of the scale (score 3). Some countries move between groups over time as the structure of
bargaining evolves. For instance, shifts towards decentralization occurred in Australia, New
Zealand and the UK, while an increase of centralization occurred in Norway. Thus, in spite
of the fact that most of the variation in CEN is cross sectional there still is some degree of
over time variation in some countries.
To measure the degree of independence of the central bank we use the legal index of
CBI (LVAU) developed by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) and Cukierman (1992).
A legal CBI index (rather than a behavioral index of independence) is chosen because that
seems to be more appropriate for developed economies (Cukierman, 1992). The index ranges
continuously between zero (least independent) and one (most independent). This index
covers all of the nineteen countries studied by the OECD and (unlike most other indices) is
available for di®erent decades.
Economic performance is measured as the average of in°ation (GDP de°ator) and of the
rate of unemployment over the ¯ve-year period for which the date of the CWB measurement
represents the midpoint.27 The OECD measures cover 19 OECD countries at three di®erent
26The original OECD measure assigns a value of centralization between 1 and 3 to each country. However
§ signs are sometimes used to qualitatively di®erenciate between countries with the same CEN value (cf.
Table 3.3 in OECD, 1997). The variable CEN assigns score 1 (decentralized) to countries which are given a
centralization value smaller or equal to 1.5 by the OECD; score 3 (centralized) is given to countries classi¯ed
as 2+, 2.5 or 3 by the OECD; score 2 (intermediate) to all the others.
27For instance, the unemployment performance corresponding to the 1980's measure of CWB is given by
the average of the unemployment rate over the ¯ve-year period 1978-82. We also constructed two alternative
performance measures for the observation of 1980 and 1990: a ten-year average (where, as before, the
midpoint is the year of institutional measurement) and an "after-measurement average" that spans the ¯ve
years beginning in the year of the institutional measurement. The results reported below are not signi¯cantly
a®ected by the choice of performance measure. We chose to present results in terms of the ¯rst measure
(¯ve-year centered average) since this makes our results comparable to those obtained in the OECD (1997)
study.
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points in time: 1980, 1990 and 1994. In principle, this provides us with 57 observations.
However, since there have been changes in the degree of CBI during the early 1990s in several
countries, six observations are dropped from the last period.28 This leaves us with a sample
of 51 observations for the development of the full sample analysis.
5.2 A preliminary look at the data
It is useful to examine whether any clear pattern emerges in a simple classi¯cation of the
data. The relation between economic performance and both CEN and CBI is shown in Tables
2 and 3. Observations are grouped according to country scores on CEN and CBI. For the
latter variable, the cuto® point LVAU<0.4 is chosen to identify a group of low-CBI countries.
Table 2 (3) shows the results obtained by pooling together the observations on unemployment
(in°ation) using data from all three periods. For example, the 5.9 ¯gure in the upper left
cell of Table 2 indicates the average unemployment rate recorded by countries that score
low on both independence and centralization. Since this data pools together observations
from three di®erent periods, we also construct a measure of the average unemployment
(in°ation) rate for country i (i = 1; 2; :::; 19) in period t (t = 1; 2; 3) in deviations from
period t average unemployment (in°ation). This "¯ltered" performance measure, reported
in parenthesis below the simple averages, diminishes the weight of observations drawn from
periods of above or below average unemployment (in°ation).
It appears from Table 2 that at low CBI (upper row of the table) there is a hump-shaped
relation between unemployment and centralization. A similar, hump shaped, relation be-
28The degree of CBI has been upgraded in Belgium, France, Italy, New-Zealand, Portugal and Spain. For
the other countries the measure of CBI for 1994 is set equal to that for the nineties. The elimination of some
high-CBI countries might in principle lead to the selection of a biased sample. However, empirical results
similar to the ones obtained here using the full sample of observations are obtained when the analysis is
con¯ned to the ¯rst two periods (1980 and 1990).
The LVAU values that are matched with the CEN values centered in 1980 and 1990 refer to the decades
of the seventies and the eighties respectively. Given data availability this is the matching procedure that
maximizes the period overlap between the two indices.
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tween in°ation and centralization is supported by the evidence in Table 3 at low independence
levels. On the other hand, the relation between unemployment (or in°ation) and centraliza-
tion shows no clear pattern at high levels of CBI. These relationships appear more clearly
when "¯ltered averages" are used.29
The tables also suggest that the sign and magnitude of the relation between in°ation
and unemployment, on one hand, and CBI, on the other, varies across di®erent levels of
centralization. In particular, comparison of the ¯rst and second rows in Table 3, points to
the existence of a relatively large negative impact of CBI on in°ation at intermediate CEN,
but the sign of the impact is unclear at other levels of centralization. It can be seen from
the last column of Table 3 that, without controlling for centralization, the well documented
negative correlation between in°ation and CBI appears.
5.3 Regression analysis
An attempt to provide a statistical assessment of the relations displayed in Tables 2 and
3, that controls for other variables, is performed by means of regression analysis. As the
centralization measure has a completely discrete nature, we use three dummy variables to
measure the e®ects of low, intermediate and high centralization without imposing an a-
priori spacing on the e®ects of di®erent centralization levels.30 The typical regression that




(¯j + °j ¢ CBI)DCj +
X
h





1 if CEN = j
0 otherwise
j = 1; 2; 3
29A similar picture emerges if the third period is excluded from the sample (see Cukierman and Lippi,
1998, Tables 3 and 4).
30In principle the same reasoning applies to the CBI index. However, this has a more continuous nature in
the [0-1] interval and its classi¯cation into dummies would require an arbitrary de¯nition of classes of CBI
levels which we avoid here.
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where y is equal to either in°ation or unemployment, CBI is the central bank independence
index described before, the three dummies DCj capture the di®erent centralization levels
(e.g. DC2 = 1 if CEN = 2 and zero otherwise), controlh indicates some control variables
described below (among which two period dummies, Dumper1 and Dumper2, when data for
more than one period are used) and " is the error term of the equation. The interaction terms
between CBI and DCj allow the relation between economic performance and centralization
to depend on the degree of central bank independence, as suggested by the theory.31
5.3.1 Estimation results
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of the regression analysis for unemployment and in°ation,
respectively. Before testing the speci¯cation in equation (19), a benchmark regression that
does not include interaction terms between DCj and CBI (i.e. °j = 0) was estimated.
The results are reported in the ¯rst column of each table (equations 4.1 and 5.1). The
estimated coe±cients of the centralization dummies do not indicate the existence of a hump-
shaped relation between unemployment and centralization and show only a weak one in the
case of in°ation. An F-test reveals that in neither equation it is possible to reject (at the
ten per cent level) the null joint hypothesis that there are no signi¯cant di®erences across
centralization levels (¯1 = ¯2 = ¯3). This con¯rms the results of the OECD (1997) where,
using basically the same data, no evidence of a hump-shaped relation between centralization
and unemployment is found.
The second column of each table shows the full-sample estimates of equation (19) when
the interaction terms are used. It appears that these terms signi¯cantly improve the ex-
planatory power of the regression (particularly for unemployment) and, more importantly,
31We also experimented with two alternative speci¯cations. One where the variable CEN, and its squared
value, were used directly as explanatory variables, accounting for their interactions with the CBI index (see
Cukierman and Lippi, 1998). Another used a modi¯ed measure of centralization, which rearranges the values
of CEN so as to create an expected linear relation between these and economic perfomance. This method has
been followed by Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988) and by Bleaney (1996). Overall, the results are qualitatively
similar to the ones reported here.
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reveal some di®erences between centralization levels. In both equations 4.2 and 5.2 the co-
e±cient of DC2 is statistically di®erent (and larger) than the coe±cient of DC1 (the F-test
rejects the null hypothesis of identical coe±cients at the 1 per cent level). For the in°ation
equation there is also evidence that the coe±cient of DC3 is signi¯cantly smaller than that
of DC2. This provides evidence supporting the existence of a Calmfors-Dri±ll type rela-
tion (i.e. ¯2 > ¯3 > ¯1), in contrast to the evidence reported in equations 4.1 and 5.1, in
which interaction terms were not used. Moreover, the interaction terms between CBI and
the centralization dummies appear statistically signi¯cant, particularly at the intermediate
centralization levels for the in°ation equation and at the low and intermediate centralization
levels for the unemployment equation (the F-test on the joint signi¯cance of the °j coe±-
cients rejects the null hypothesis of zero coe±cients at the one per cent level in equation
4.2 and at the ten per cent level in equation 5.2). This is consistent with the theory which
implies that the relation between economic performance and centralization varies with the
degree of CBI.
5.3.2 Sensitivity
These results are basically unchanged when the estimation is limited to the ¯rst two periods
(equations 4.3 and 5.3) and when dummy variables are used to control for outlier observa-
tions. In equation 4.4 a dummy variable is added to the unemployment equation to control
for the unusually high Spanish unemployment rate. Similarly, in the in°ation equation 5.4
a dummy for the high average in°ation of Portugal is used.32 It appears that neither the
sign nor the statistical signi¯cance of the coe±cients is a®ected by controlling for outliers.
We also controlled the unemployment equation for the potential e®ects of other institutional
variables. In particular, Daveri and Tabellini (1997) ¯nd unemployment to be signi¯cantly
32Italy, Portugal and Spain have average in°ation rates that are much higher than those of other countries
in the sample. To allow for the possibility that this is due to factors other than those on which we focus
here, the in°ation equation was reestimated using dummy variables for each of these countries, either one
at a time or as a group. For example, when all three countries are dummied out the results are essentially
unchanged and the ¯0s and °0s coe±cients maintain sign and signi¯cance.
30
related to replacement ratios and e®ective tax rates on labor income in a sample of 14
OECD countries over the 1965-85 period.33Nickell (1997) reports similar results. To account
for those e®ects we added the Daveri and Tabellini measures of those variables as regressors
in equation 4.5. Data availability restricts observations to 14 countries and two time periods
(1980; 1990).34 In line with their ¯ndings, a positive correlation is detected between the
unemployment rate and the replacement ratio. No signi¯cant correlation emerges between
unemployment and the e®ective tax-rates on labor income. More importantly for the pur-
poses of this paper, the statistical signi¯cance and the signs of the CBI and the centralization
coe±cients are not a®ected by the addition of these variables.
Finally, we estimated equation 19, for both unemployment and in°ation, on each period
separately, to obtain pure cross sectional estimates of the coe±cients.35 The results are
qualitatively similar to those obtained from the pooled cross-section time-series data. The
hump-shaped Calmfors-Dri±ll pattern appears in the ¯j coe±cients of all equations (i.e.
¯2 > ¯3 > ¯1) except in the unemployment equation in the ¯rst period (1980) where at low
CBI there is a signi¯cant upward sloping relation between unemployment and centralization.
To get a summary measure of the implications of the pure cross sectional variation in the
data we also ran "average" cross sectional regressions in which each country's observations
are represented by the, over periods, average of the "¯ltered" performance measure (i.e.
in°ation, or unemployment, in deviations from the period-averages) and of CBI, using only
33This is a summary measure of the ratio between unemployment bene¯ts and previous earnings adjusted
for a variety of circumstances (period of unemployment, family situation, previous level of earnings). The
original source is the OECD Jobs Study.
34Daveri and Tabellini (1997) perform a panel-data analysis using non-random ¯xed e®ects for each country.
Given the limited time-series variation of our institutional observations, we only performed simple cross-
country analysis. These di®erences are important in comparing the results of their regressions with ours.
Morover, since their data are ¯ve-year averages ending in 1985, we used their last available observations
(i.e. the average of 1981-85) to match our second period (1988-92) observations. Consequently, ¯rst period
observations (1978-82) were matched with data measuring 1971-75 average e®ective labor taxation and
replacement ratios. Despite the existence of obvious improvements to this procedure this compromise is
imposed by lack of more appropriate (alternative) data.
35The results for the period by period regressions are not reported here for reasons of space.
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those observations where the CEN level is constant for at least two periods.36 The results,
based on 16 "summary" observations, are reported in the last columns of Tables 4 and
5 (equations 4.6 and 5.5). The ¯j coe±cients of both equations suggest the existence of
a Calmfors-Dri±ll pattern, although this e®ect is clearly signi¯cant only in the in°ation
equation (the F-test rejects the joint hypothesis of equal ¯ coe±cients at the 1 per cent level
for in°ation and at the 10 per cent level for unemployment). Moreover, consistently with the
evidence presented before, CBI has a signi¯cant negative impact on in°ation at intermediate
centralization levels, while the sign of its impact on unemployment is unchanged (but not
signi¯cant).
5.3.3 Theory and evidence
As the theory predicts that economic performance varies with both CBI and centralization,
we use the estimated equations to examine the consistency between the empirical evidence
and the theory presented before. Panel a of Table 6 presents the simulated unemployment
and in°ation values predicted by equations 4.5 and 5.4 when all control variables are set
to zero.37 When centralization is equal to j (j = 1; 2; 3), the in°ation (unemployment)
rate implied by the estimated equation is thus given by
³
^̄
j + °̂j ¢ CBI
´
, which is the value
reported in each cell of the table.
It appears that, at low CBI levels, a hump shaped relation between unemployment (in-
°ation) and the degree of centralization is clearly in evidence. The joint hypothesis that
the predicted values of unemployment and in°ation are identical across centralization levels
at low CBI (i.e. at CBI0.3) is strongly rejected by the data for both the unemployment
and the in°ation equations.38 However, the same hypothesis cannot be rejected at higher
36We are thankful to a referee who suggested this procedure. We avoid averaging over di®erent CEN levels
because of the expected non-linearity between CEN and economic performance. Similar results are obtained
when the summary measure is constructed using the non-¯ltered performance measure.
37A similar picture emerges from the predictions of the other estimated equations.
38We test the null joint hypothesis: ¯1 + °1CBI = ¯2 + °2CBI = ¯3 +°3CBI at various CBI levels using
the Wald test for linear restrictions. The results are reported in the shaded columns of Table 6.
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CBI levels (i.e. at CBI¸0.4). This evidence appears to be consistent with proposition 2
which implies that a hump-shaped relation of the Calmfors-Dri±ll type is more likely to be
observed at low (rather than at high) CBI levels. Moreover, as suggested by proposition 3,
in°ation and unemployment display a similar qualitative relation with centralization once
CBI is controlled for. A similar picture emerges from Panel b of Table 6, where the in°ation
and unemployment values are generated from the pure cross sectional equations 4.6 and 5.5.
Table 5 also indicates that the correlation between CBI and in°ation is negative in two
out of three cases (but is statistically di®erent from zero only at intermediate CEN). This
is not inconsistent with the model's prediction (proposition 6). Moreover, it appears from
Table 4 that CBI has a positive impact on unemployment at low centralization (which is
consistent with proposition 5) and a negative impact at intermediate centralization, but
only the former e®ect is signi¯cant under di®erent speci¯cations of the equation (see e.g.
equations 4.4 and 5.4).
Overall, the empirical evidence does not contradict the broad implications of our model
concerning the existence of interaction e®ects between CWB, CBI and macroeconomic perfor-
mance. We also ¯nd that higher CBI reduces in°ation, particularly at intermediate central-
ization levels, and that it tends to increase unemployment, particularly at low centralization
levels.
6 Brief Comparison to Recent Literature
Although most of the literature on strategic monetary policy abstracts from the in°ation
aversion of unions and of the moderation in wage demands that it induces, there is a small
literature, mainly from the nineties, that analyzes this e®ect in the context of a single
union (references appear in footnote 4). Bleaney (1996) and Forteza (1998) consider a game
between the CB and a number of unions but without taking the in°ation aversion of unions
into account. This paper and the companion paper by Velasco and Guzzo (1999) (discussed
below) are the ¯rst to consider both of those factors in a uni¯ed framework.
This paper quali¯es and extends previous literature. For example, Cubitt (1992) and
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Agell and Isander (1993) simply assume that when wage bargaining is centralized unions
care more about in°ation. This paper derives this as a result, from a framework in which
unions' in°ation aversion is basically independent of the degree of CWB, but in which their
actions are more strongly a®ected by their in°ation aversion the smaller their number. Both
atomistic (e.g. Barro and Gordon, 1983) and non-atomistic unions' models can be seen as
special cases of our model. Di®erentiating between the economic impact of CWB and that
of unions' in°ation aversion is important since each of these structural parameters generally
may vary independently of the other.
This paper would not be complete without a comparison with the closely related article
by Velasco and Guzzo (1999) that appears in this issue of the Review. Both papers propose
frameworks that are designed to clarify the e®ects of CWB and of CBI on the performance of
the economy in the presence of in°ation averse unions. But some of the primitive assumptions
of the two models di®er. In particular we work with a speci¯cation of labor demand facing
the individual union in which the wage elasticity rises with the number of unions. Velasco
and Guzzo (VG henceforth) start from a production function that utilizes all available types
of workers in the economy and features, when the wages of all individuals are equal, a
constant elasticity of substitution across di®erent individuals. Their speci¯cation implies
that the wage elasticity of labor demand facing the individual union may be either increasing
or decreasing in the number of unions, depending on the magnitude of the elasticity of
substitution between the di®erent types of workers.
In spite of those modeling di®erences both papers obtain some common results the most
notable of which are that employment is decreasing in CBI and that welfare is maximized
(and the in°ation bias reduced to zero) when the CB is ultra-liberal. But the framework
of VG implies that employment is either monotonically increasing with centralization, or
humped shaped in it (a reverse Calmfors-Dri±ll curve) for all levels of CBI. We obtain
diametrically opposed results: employment is either monotonically decreasing with central-
ization or U shaped in it as hypothesized by Calmfors and Dri±ll. Since in both papers
employment and real wages are negatively related, this di®erence in results also carries over
to the relation between real wages and centralization, appropriately adjusted for the change
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in sign. Two features of the VG framework are responsible for their results. One is that their
speci¯cation implies that the strategic e®ect (or, in their language, the "internalization" ef-
fect) does not vanish even when the number of unions becomes large. The other is that the
elasticity of labor demand facing an individual union may be decreasing in the number of
unions. In other words, an increase in the number of unions may actually reduce the level
of e®ective competition in the labor market.
Our empirical ¯nding that unemployment is hump shaped in centralization at low levels
of CBI is inconsistent with the "reverse Calmfors-Dri±ll curve" implication of the VG model.
Also, the positive and signi¯cant relation between unemployment and centralization detected
in the ¯rst period (see section 5.3.2) is consistent with our model (see panel a of Figure
2), while the evidence never shows signi¯cantly lower unemployment rates at intermediate
centralization levels (as suggested by the VG model). Thus, while the theoretical results of
VG are, as they put it, in "stark contrast with conventional wisdom and the arguments of
Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988)" the theory and the evidence presented in this paper are rather
supportive of this "conventional wisdom".
The interactions between CBI and the industrial organization of labor markets might
obviously have important implications for the economic e®ects of EMU. Gruner and Hefeker
(forthcoming) present an interesting analysis along those lines within a framework that
features one in°ation averse union in each country.39 The theoretical framework of our
paper can be used to extend the analysis of Gruner and Hefeker (forthcoming) to the case of
many unions in each country. Cukierman and Lippi (1998a) provide a preliminary analysis
of this case. A basic intuitive factor that underlies the analysis in both papers is that, by
altering the relative size of unions (making all of them more numerous in their strategic
interaction with the central bank), the formation of a monetary union induces trade unions
to be more aggressive.
To this point all the discussion has abstracted from open economy considerations. In the
presence of such considerations there are additional interactions between centralization and
39Iversen (1998) and Jimeno (1998) also analyze how the e®ects of the EMU establishment are related to
the organization of the labor market.
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the equilibrium terms of trade facing a country. In particular, Rama (1994) shows that, in
an open economy facing a less than in¯nitely elastic demand, the degree of centralization
also a®ects the extent to which unions internalize the e®ect of their wage decisions on their
country's terms of trade.40
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a conceptual framework that makes it possible to investigate the e®ects
of CBI, CWB, and of the interaction between those institutional variables, on in°ation,
unemployment and real wages. The accepted view in the strategic literature on monetary
policy is that, in the presence of perfect information (including, in particular, the absence
of unanticipated real shocks that could be stabilized by means of monetary policy), real
wages and unemployment are independent of the organization of monetary institutions. The
theory developed here suggests instead a number of channels through which labor market
performance is also in°uenced by CBI and by its interaction with the CWB. This implies
that, in the presence of non-atomistic unions, it may be misleading to study the e®ects of
labor market variables (such as CWB) without controlling for the type of monetary regime
(and vice versa).
One speci¯c corollary of this general observation is that a Calmfors-Dri±ll hump-shaped
relation between unemployment (in°ation) and CWB is more likely to arise when CBI is
su±ciently small, when labor unions are su±ciently averse to in°ation and the lower the
e®ect of more competition in the labor market on real wages. The hump-shaped relation
of our model is the consequence of two opposite e®ects of centralization. On one hand,
centralization reduces the degree of competition in the labor market. On the other hand it
increases the extent to which each union internalizes the consequences of its wage choice on
aggregate in°ation.41 While the model shows that a hump-shaped relation of the Calmfors-
40Some related work for open economies has been undertaken by Jensen (1997) and Zervoyianni (1997).
41Our model can therefore be viewed as a precise characterization of the free rider problem discussed in
De Grauwe (1992, p.22): "[..] individual unions that bargain for higher nominal wages know that the e®ect
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Dri±ll type may exist, it also predicts that the hump-shaped relation should gradually
weaken, and eventually become monotonically increasing in centralization, as CBI increases.
This implies that, in countries with highly independent central banks, decentralization of
bargaining in the labor market is likely to reduce real wages, unemployment and in°ation.
A second set of results concerns the conditions under which CBI may be expected to have
an impact on unemployment. Two channels are identi¯ed. First, if trade unions care about
in°ation, central bank conservatism in°uences wage-setting decisions by a®ecting unions'
perception of how in°ationary their individual actions are. Hence, a more conservative
central bank induces more aggressive wage behavior on the part of unions by reducing the
impact of their wage setting decisions on in°ation.
If there is more than one union in the economy there is a second "competition induced
strategic non neutrality" that operates independently of whether unions are or are not averse
to in°ation. This is due to the fact that the tradeo® between the real wage and the relative
wage facing the individual union depends on the in°ation aversion of the central bank. We
showed that the increase in the relative wage that a union has to undergo to obtain a unit
increase in its real wage is larger if the central bank is less in°ation averse. This implies
that the perceived reduction in competitiveness caused by a higher real wage is decreasing in
the level of CBI. The magnitude of this non neutrality thus depends on the degree of labor
substitutability and on the e®ective conservatism of monetary policy. Even when unions are
not in°ation averse this non neutrality moderates unions' real wage demands in comparison
to a situation in which wages are fully indexed. Both types of non-neutralities exist due
to the fact that unions are non-atomistic and perceive the macroeconomic consequences of
their actions. As unions become atomistic these (strategic) non-neutralities vanish. The ¯rst
of these nominal wage increases on the aggregate price level is small, because these unions only represent a
small fraction of the labor force. In equilibrium this non-cooperative game will produce a higher nominal
wage than the cooperative (centralized) game." The main di®erences between his (informal) discussion and
our framework are that we explicitly introduce the role of competition between unions in the labor market
and that we study a world without shocks. As a matter of fact, the latter issue could be examined by
introducing supply shocks into our framework.
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strategic non neutrality has been noticed in some of the recent literature within the context
of a single union (footnote 4). The second one is novel. This should not be surprising in
view of the fact that the second non neutrality appears only when there is more than union
in the economy.
Examination of the evidence using data from nineteen OECD countries during the eight-
ies and the early nineties provides support for some of the implications of the theory. In
particular, for low levels of CBI, the evidence identi¯es a clear hump-shaped relation between
unemployment and in°ation, on the one hand, and between centralization on the other. This
relation vanishes at high levels of CBI. Both ¯ndings are consistent with the predictions of
our model. They may shed light on why evidence on the existence of a hump-shaped relation
was mixed. Previous studies, for instance OECD (1997) and others (see footnote(24)), did
not control for CBI (and for its interactions with the CWB) when estimating the relation
between CWB and economic performance. When CBI is deliberately omitted from the set
of explanatory variables, our data replicates the OECD result that points to the lack of
evidence in favor of a hump-shaped relation.42
The evidence also shows that the in°ation-reducing impact of CBI on in°ation is largest
when centralization of wage bargaining is at intermediate levels and that there is a signi¯cant
and positive e®ect of CBI on unemployment at low levels of centralization. These results
appear robust to a number of alternative speci¯cations. Since the over time variation of
the institutional variables is relatively limited those ¯ndings mainly re°ect cross country
di®erences. Overall, the empirical analysis indicates that the interaction e®ects between
CBI and CWB suggested by the theory receive some support from the data.
In order to present our basic arguments we have assumed, for simplicity, that labor
supplies are completely inelastic, that all unions have the same number of members, and
that ¯rms behave as wage takers in the labor market. We also abstracted from the structure
of ¯nal goods markets and from open economy considerations. The investigation of these
42In terms of our theory, the OECD procedure may have led them to pool observations over which the
relation exists (those from the low-CBI group) with observations over which it does not exist (those from
the high-CBI group).
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issues will provide a check of robustness and further insights into the properties of CBI and
CWB. This is left for future work.
8 Appendix
8.1 Derivation of the equilibrium wage premium
Di®erentiating with respect to wj, the ¯rst order condition for the typical union's problem
is:
2E f¡Z +A [® (wj ¡ ¼ ¡ p¡1 ¡ wcr) + °n(wj ¡ ¹w)] (®Z + °(n¡ 1)) +B¼(1¡ Z)g = 0:
(20)
Noting that Áj = wj ¡ ¼ ¡ p¡1 ¡ wcr, and that there is perfect information, this ¯rst order
condition can be rewritten as :
¡Z +A
h
®Áj + °n(Áj ¡ Á)
i
(®Z + °(n¡ 1)) +B¼(1¡ Z) = 0 (21)
Equation (12) in the text is obtained by summing equation (21) over all unions, dividing
the resulting expression by n, using equation (9), and rearranging.
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